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SUPREME COURT WATCH
RECENT DECISIONS OF SELECTED CRIMINAL CASES | BY STEPHANIE CANNULI AND MONICA TRIGOSO

MARTINEZ v. RYAN

HOWES v. FIELDS

Docket Number: 10-1001
Argument: October 4, 2011

Docket Number: 10-680
Argument: October 4, 2011

Issue:
Whether a Defendant in a state criminal case who is prohibited by state law from raising on direct appeal has any claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but who has a state-law
right to raise such a claim in a post-conviction counsel with
respect to their ineffective-assistance of trial counsel claim?

Issue:
(1) Whether the right against self-incrimination requires
that a prisoner always be Mirandized before being interviewed
in isolation about conduct that occurred outside the prison.
(2) Whether the Court in Mathis clearly established such
a per se rule.

Facts:
The Petitioner, Luis Martinez seeks to overturn his conviction on the ineffective assistance of trial counsel ground.
Martinez pursued a direct appeal on several grounds but was
not allowed to raise this particular claim because Arizona law
provides that ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a state
collateral proceeding, but has failed to file a timely petition.
Since the petition was not filed on time, Arizona considered the
claim to have been waived. Due to running out of chance in
Arizona, Martinez filed a habeas petition in federal court with
his underlying claim being the ineffective assistance of counsel. Federal courts will not consider the merits of the claim
raised in a habeas petition if it is in regards to failure to follow
state procedural rules. A petitioner’s “procedural default” can
be excused if they show “cause” and ineffective assistance of
counsel may constitute as “cause.” Martinez claimed that his
appellate counsel was also ineffective and failed to file state collateral review petition. The Court granted certiorari, to whether
the Petitioner had a constitutional right to counsel in the state
proceeding.

Facts:
Randall Lee Fields was incarcerated at the Lenawee County
Sheriff’s Department, when a corrections officer escorted him
from his cell to a locked conference room in the main area of
the sheriff’s department. In the conference room, two deputy
sheriffs questioned him. Neither sheriff read Fields his Miranda
rights, but told him that if he did not want to cooperate, he was
free to leave the room at any time. Fields did not ask for an
attorney or to go back to his cell, however he told the officers
more than once that he did not want to speak with them anymore. Fields was not handcuffed or restrained in any way during the questioning, which lasted seven hours.
During the questioning, Fields made incriminating statements, leading to his conviction on two counts of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct. Fields filed a pro se petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, for a writ of habeas corpus on three
grounds. The relevant ground to the instant appeal was a violation of Mr. Fields’ due process rights by the admission of his
alleged custodial statement. The district court conditionally
granted Fields’ habeas petition, holding that the state court unreasonably applied Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968)
(holding that Miranda warnings must be administered when law
enforcement officers remove an inmate from the general prison
population and interrogate him regarding criminal conduct that
took place outside the jail or prison). The court further held
that the state court’s error was not harmless. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that because Fields was removed from the
general prison population for interrogation about an offense
unrelated to the one for which he was incarcerated, Mathis is
the applicable law. Therefore, the failure to suppress Fields’
confession was not harmless error.
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The petitioner argues on appeal to the Supreme Court that
in so holding, the Sixth Circuit has created a bright-line rule
that prisoners isolated from the general prison population must
always receive a Miranda warning before interrogation commences when asked about conduct that occurred outside the facility. The petitioner argues that such a per se rule is contrary to
precedent, which mandates a context-specific analysis. Further,
because a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner only if the earlier state court decision was contrary to or an
unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1), the petitioner argues that Sixth Circuit’s grant of
habeas relief should be reversed.

GREENE v. FISHER
Docket Number: 10-637
Argument: October 11, 2011
Issue:
For purposes of adjudicating a state prisoner’s petition for
federal habeas relief, what is the temporal cutoff for whether a
decision from this Court qualifies as clearly established Federal
law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) as amended by the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?
Facts:
Eric Greene was found guilty of second-degree murder and
other crimes and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Greene
was tried with four other co-defendants but two of them had
made pretrial statements which connected Greene to the robbery/murder. The statements were redacted but Greene was
unable to cross-examine to challenge the statements made by
the co-defendants since they did not testify in court.
Greene later appealed his conviction to the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania claiming he was not given his rights under the
Confrontation Clause. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the conviction since the statements had been redacted.
Greene again presented his claim to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court which granted the petition, but was later dismissed as
been having “been improvidently granted.”
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FLORENCE v. BOARD OF FREEHOLDERS
Docket Number: 10-945
Argument: October 12, 2011
Issue:
Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a jail to conduct
a suspicionless strip search whenever an individual is arrested
and admitted to the general population, including for minor
offenses.
Facts:
After being stopped for a traffic infraction, the petitioner,
Albert W. Florence, was arrested on an outstanding warrant for
a noncriminal offense. He was taken to the Burlington County
Jail (BCJ). Pursuant to intake policy, he was subjected to a
strip and visual body-cavity search. After being held for six
days, Florence was sent to Essex County Correctional Facility (ECCF), where he was again subject to a strip search upon
his arrival. Florence sued BCJ, ECCF, and various individuals
and municipal entities (collectively, the Jails) under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. On appeal is his Fourth Amendment challenge to the
strip search procedures at BCJ and ECCF.
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that
the Fourth Amendment permits a general policy of suspicionless strip searches upon admission to jail, whatever the circumstances, and that evidence that such a policy would detect or
deter illegal activity was not necessary. Both courts decisions
were based off of contrasting sides on a widely acknowledged
eight-to-three circuit split, which is rooted in irreconcilable interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The petitioner argues that the court’s
decision cannot be reconciled with the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents, which hold that such an intrusive search is
reasonable only if there is some basis to suspect that the individual is engaging in some form of illegality, such as smuggling
contraband.
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LAFLER v. COOPER
Docket Number: 10-209
Argument: October 31, 2011
Issue:
(1) Whether a defendant seeking habeas is entitled to relief
based on ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel’s deficient advice caused the defendant to reject a plea bargain where
the defendant had no vested right and the rejection did not deny
the defendant a fair trial.
(2) What remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargain negotiations if the
defendant was later convicted and sentenced pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures?
Facts:
Cooper was on trial for assault with intent to murder. The
prosecution offered Cooper two plea deals with lesser sentences
than he would have had received under the sentencing guidelines. Cooper’s counsel advised Cooper that the state would not
be able to prove assault with intent to murder since Cooper shot
the victim below the waist. Cooper’s counsel believed Cooper
would get a better plea deal later. Cooper rejected both of the
offers due to his counsel’s advice and received a sentence longer than what was offered in either of the plea deals. Cooper
argues that effective assistance of counsel is critical in all stages
of a criminal proceeding. Therefore, Cooper argues that his
trial counsel’s ineffective assistance prejudiced his trial, and he
is entitled to reinstatement of the plea offer. Petitioner, Lafler, argues that rejection of a plea bargain is not a critical state
contends that Cooper is not entitled to relief because Cooper received a fair trial and there was no Sixth Amendment violation.

REHBERG v. PAULK
Docket Number: 10-788
Argument: November 1, 2011
Issue:
Whether a government official who acts as a complaining
witness by presenting perjured testimony against an innocent
citizen is entitled to absolute immunity from a § 1983 claim for
civil damages.
Facts:
Rehberg sent anonymous faxes to Putney Memorial Hospital to bring awareness of the suspicious billing and accounting
practices. The Dougherty County District Attorney’s Office
began investigation on Rehberg and his actions. Rehberg
claimed that Paulk started the investigation against him without probable cause. Regberg was indicted three times due to
Criminal Law Brief

the investigations, for separate but similar grounds and were
widely publicized. After the third indictment Rehberg filed
a federal civil rights claim under § 1983 alleging that Paulk’s
activities constituted retaliatory investigation and malicious
prosecution. The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Georgia denied Paulk’s claim and Paulk appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit overturned the
district court’s decision concluding that Paulk was entitled to
absolute immunity.

PERRY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE
Docket Number: 10-8974
Argument: November 2, 2011
Issue:
Whether the due process safeguards against the use of unreliable identification evidence at trial require court to inquire
into the reliability of all identifications that arise from suggestive circumstances, or only to those identifications that are the
product of improper state action.
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted of one class B felony count of
theft by unauthorized taking. At the suppression hearing,
Nashua Police Officer Nicole Clay was the sole testifying witness. On the date of the incident, Officer Clay had been sent to
a parking lot to investigate a report about a black male looking
through vehicles and attempting to gain entry into vehicles. She
saw the petitioner carrying two amplifiers and walking toward
her from between two vehicles. A resident of the apartment
building overlooking the parking lot, Nubia Blandon, said that
she had seen a tall, black man walk through the parking lot,
look into all the cars, circle one car, and then open the trunk and
remove a large box. She then identified the petitioner, who was
standing with another officer in the parking lot. When Blandon
was shown a photographic array a month later, she was unable
to identify the petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the identification procedure had been
“unnecessarily suggestive” because Blandon had identified the
petitioner only after she had seen the police cruisers, and had
seen the petitioner being arrested and put in handcuffs by police officers. Under these circumstances, states the Petitioner,
the identification was unreliable. Accordingly, the petitioner
argues, under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the court
must exclude the identification. The State contends that no
due process violation occurred because the identification was
not facilitated by the police in any fashion, and was not suggestive. The New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the
State. It determined that the admission in a criminal trial of a
pretrial identification cannot violate due process where no im59

proper state action has caused the circumstances under which
the identification was made. On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the petitioner specifically argues that the Due Process Clause
does not require a criminal defendant to show improper state
action by the police in order to challenge the admissibility of an
identification arising from suggestive circumstances.

KAWASHIMA v. HOLDER
Docket Number: 10-577
Argument: November 7, 2011
Issue:
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Petitioner’s
convictions of filing, and aiding and abetting in filing, a false
statement on a corporate tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§§ 7206(1) and (2) were aggravated felonies involving fraud
and deceit under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(M)(i), and Petitioners were
therefore removable.
Facts:
Kawashima was convicted of filing false corporate tax returns, and his wife was convicted of helping him file. Immigration laws allow for deportation of persons who are convicted
of an “aggravated felony. It used to be a term to define crimes
like murder, but now has changed to include offenses which
“(i) involves fraud or deceit” where the victim losses exceed
$10,000 or some form of tax evasion where the “revenue loss to
the government exceeds $10,000.” The question presented is
whether Congress intended on this broad definition of the term.
The Kawashimas argue that Congress intended to leave other
types of tax violations by limiting the subsection to tax evasion.
The government argues that tax evasion is a form of “fraud or
deceit” so it falls within the subsection.

U.S. v. JONES
Docket Number: 10-1259
Argument: November 8, 2011
Issue:
(1) Whether the warrantless use of tracking device on respondent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets
violated the Fourth Amendment.
(2) Whether the government violated the respondent’s
Fourth Amendment rights by installing the Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent.
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Facts:
In 2004, D.C. police had installed a GPS tracking device to
Antoine Jones’ vehicle to track his locations over time to monitor cocaine-selling operation. The warrant needed the GPS to be
placed on Jones’ car within ten days and the installation to occur
within D.C., but it took eleven days for it to be installed while
the car was in Maryland. The warrant had expired. The police
monitored Jones for a month and subsequently he was convicted
of drug offenses and sentenced to life in prison. In 2010, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for D.C. held that federal agents do not have
unfettered right to install GPS devices without a search warrant
since it required monitoring over the course of the day. The
government’s main argument is on the private facts model focusing on the car being on public streets and therefore should not
be protected.

SMITH v. CAIN
Docket Number: 10-8145
Argument: November 8, 2011
Issue:
(1) Whether the undisclosed pre-trial statements of the prosecution’s key witness in a criminal trial would have led to a different result for the defendant.
(2) Whether the state courts violated the Due Process Clause
by rejecting the defendant’s Brady and Giglio/Napue claims.
Facts:
After a jury trial, petitioner was convicted in Louisiana State
Court on five counts of first-degree murder. The testimony at
trial established that a group of men burst into a house, ordered
the occupants to lie down on the floor, and opened fire, resulting
in five deaths. Petitioner was the only person tried for the crime.
Petitioner was tried in Orleans Parish, Louisiana, a jurisdiction whose district attorney’s office has a history of allegations of
failing to produce exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.
The key evidence linking him to the crime was identification by
one of the survivors. At trial, this witness testified he was certain
about his identification. Materials disclosed by the state after
trial, however, revealed that the prosecution withheld materials
arguably relating to the issue of the defendant’s guilt—specifically materials showing the witness had made numerous conflicting statements to the police concerning his ability to identify any
of the perpetrators.
Petitioner applied for state post-conviction relief, contending, inter alia, that the Orleans Parish district attorney’s office
had withheld material evidence in violation of his right to due
process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Napue v. Illinois, 360
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U.S. 264 (1959). The petitioner argued that together, these cases
establish a violation of a defendant’s right to due process when
the state withholds favorable evidence that is material to a defendant’s guilt or punishment, or knowingly to use false evidence
to procure a conviction or sentence. The trial court summarily
denied petitioner’s application for post-conviction relief from the
bench. The Louisiana Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for discretionary review without comment, as did the
Louisiana Supreme Court. The petitioner argues that if these
materials had been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability
that the result of petitioner’s trial would have been different. Respondent counters that the petitioner failed to satisfy the threshold requirements of Brady, and further, that petitioner suffered
no prejudice from any such failure to disclose the statements.
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